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ABSTRACT
From the early use in the nineteen 'fifties of fixed coefficient
Input-Output (I-O) models in analysing the -consistency and technical
feasibility of development plans, economy-wide models have become
indispensable tools of analysis in the armory of economist~ interested in
development planning. The I-O models were succeeded by their lineal
descendents, the linear programming (LP) or more generally, the activity
analysis models, and still later by the so-called computable general
equilibrium (CGE) models. While this increase in size, scope and
sophistication in modelling was no doubt a reflection in large part of the
advances in economic theory and computational algorithms and techniques that
took place during the post-war period, it is also in part influenced by
changing perception of the relative importance of growth and ·equity in the
distribution of fruits of growth in designing development strategies in mixed
economies.
It is argued in the paper that while CGE models have a number of
advantages over the I-O and LP models in their providing a more satisfactory
picture of the economy in terms of an equilibrium in which prices are flexible
(albeit tempered by government interventions), markets clear and agents
optimize given prices and relevant constraints. However, beyond analysing
resource pulls generated by alternative policy interventions, they have proved
to be of limited value in illuminating the development process largely because
they are restricted in important ways by the nature of their theoretical
foundation. What they can say about income distribution is limited, and their
treatment of factor employment, based as it is on crude specification of the
functions of labour markets, is not altogether convincing. More importantly,
they are particularly ill-suited to analyse processes involving real time,
such as accumulation and inflation. Their fruitful application for this
purpose may have to await further theoretical development.

1 · _....
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On The Uses and Abuses of Economy-Wide Models
in Development Policy Analysis

~

1.

INTRODUCTION
Find an economist with a keen interest in development planning and

almost certainly there will be an economy-wide model in the offing.

In

drawing up a consistent and feas•ible Plan, for example, it is essential to
take .i nto account industries' requirements for intermediate and capital goods
and the circular flow of production, incomes and demand, treating them in such
detail as their importance seems to warrant -- or the data permit.

Not so

l ong ago, the only formal and practicable model available for this task wa,s
the f i xed-coefficients Leontief model.

Cleverly used and ingeniously

extended, the Leontief model and its close, linear programming (LP) cousins
gave i ntellectual support to, and perhaps greater confidence in, the
economist ' s assessment of how much i nvestment should be made and to which
i ndustri es i t should goc

From i ts origins in the 1950s, this work has grown

into an estab li shed and distinguished tradition, to which Chenery has made
such notable contributions .

•

Now, the assumption of fixed coefficients was in keeping with the
tenor of the times; for it implies a homogeneous linear relationship between
•·"""

inputs and outputs in production, between income and the commodity composition
of private consumption, and among imports, exports and national income i n
foreign trade.

Such a relationship was basic to formal models in the

Keynesian tradition, and also reflected a strong residue of 'elasticity
pessimism' about foreign trade from the inter-war period.

In principle, of

course, one could approximate (to any desired degree of accuracy) a 'smooth '
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neo-classical production function or indifference surface by a set of
production or consumption activities, each of which involves a homogeneous
linear relationship; indeed, many LP models allowed substitution in this
way.

It was nevertheless the case that the choice among activities in these

models did not reflect cost minimization (or utility maximization) given
endogenously determined market prices for inputs, outputs and factors.
This appeal to fixed coefficients could be justified on grounds that,
so to speak, span the spectrum of possibilities.

First, it may be argued that

the relevant elasticities of substitution are low enough to make fixedcoefficients a satisfactory approximation in that even substantial changes in
the relevant prices will not result in significant changes in coefficients
under competitive conditions.

In short, changes in prices will not matter,

except for any income effects they may have.

Secondly, if there are constant

returns to scale and highly elastic supplies of factors, the relative prices
of commodities will not change, and so it does not matter whether commodities
(and factors) are good substitutes in consumption (production).
can contrive a story in which prices do not change anyway!
was a practical one:

In short, one

The third defense

neither proven algorithms nor the computational power

were available to solve systems in which both quantities and prices are
mutually and simultaneously determined.

Early on, however, Chenery - and Uzawa

[1958] had introduced non-linearities into a planning model.

Subsequently,

Chenery and Raduchel [1971] developed a compact, but quite generally specified
model with "representative" data from cross-section studies to address the
question:

Is substitution likely to matter in practice?
While the first and second defenses of the use of fixed coefficients

were already under some pressure, the third was beginning to crumble by the

---
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In particular, it had become possible to compute

competitive (more generally, flex-price) equilibria for eco.n omies with
numerous factors and goods.

This achievement held out the promise of more

't

refined calculations of the effects of public policy on patterns of resource
·allocation than those perm.i tted by fix-price frameworks.

Yet there was a more

alluring prospect still; for if the relative prices of factors and goods are
endogenously determined, one can derive the distribution of factor incomes
under fairly general conditions and thence, under appropriate assumptions
about the distribution of factor endowments among households, proceed to the
distribution of real household incomes.

Such an approach to income

distribution was far more appealing from a theoretical standpoint than earlier
attempts to assess the impact of exogenously specified changes in the
distribution of household consumption within the framework of an input-output
planning model, as was done in India in the mid-'sixties, for example.

Given

the urgency of understanding better how growth and income distribution are
related in the development process, this opportunity was eagerly seized.
Yet another reason for the move away from the planning models of the
'fifties and 'sixties was the growing dissatisfaction with development
planning in mixed economies with dominant private sectors.

It was argued that

the development plans of many developing countries had little or no relation
to the feasible set of policy instruments available to planners of these
countries.

From the optimistic assertion attributed to a highly placed Indian

planner that "to any physically feasible plan there corresponds a feasible
financing scheme (in terms of taxes, transfers, domestic and foreign savings,
and investment)," the mood shifted to pessimism about successfully
implementing any plan unless it was compatible with private incentives.
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Moreover, these incentives were initially affected by a myriad of other
policies, such as import quotas and capacity licensing, let alone taxes and
subsidies.

Thus, if the early development planning models (particularly those

of the optimizing genre) could be described somewhat, but not entirely,

.

inaccurately as assuming that the "first best" policy instruments. were .
available for implementing the plan, the search was on for models that had a
1

"second best", if not an Nth best, character abou t them.

Given the dominance

of the private sector in many of these economies, it was natural that the
search would focus on models influenced by the spirit of Walrasian general
competitive equilibrium, albeit tempered by "second best" considerations.
At about that time, many of the ideas, problems and techniques in
development planning had been discussed in general terms in Blitzer, .::.E_~
(1975].

There, Taylor emphasized that "there is no single best model for use

by all planning offices.

Rather, there is a wide range of possible

specifications -- an appropriate one in a given country depending on factors
ranging from data availability, to the institutional framework for planning,
to the specific policy problems under discussion.". (p. 33)

While agnostic

about the additional light shed by optimizing models compared to consistency
models of the input-output type, and properly skeptical about ·the relevance of
the implicit assumption, shared by most of the models, of perfect competition,
Taylor nevetheless concluded that:

"If we had a better theory of prices and

economic power than the Walrasian one, model builders would clearly use it.
At the moment, however, all that can be said is that an LP model is likely to
be a poor facsimile for a Walrasian economy, while a nonlinear constant
returns model will be a better one.

If competition is basically the only game

in town, you might as well play it with elegance".

(p. 100)

There followed

-
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the pioneering work of Adelman and Robinson (1978] on Korea and Taylor~ al.
(1980] on Brazil, and then a growing stream of what Adelman and Robinson
christened as "computable general equilibrium models" (hereafter, CGEs).

JJ

Like the fall fashions of the couturiers of Paris, however, these approaches
to elegance, i.e., the specification of the model and the algorithm to solve
it, were not always the same.

We shall examine these variations in style and

substance in Sections 2 and 3.
Independently of the work on CGEs for developing countries, other
researchers, following the methodological breakthrough of Scarf (1973], built
CGEs to analyze the effects of fiscal and foreign trade policies pursued in
developed countries, a body of research which is surveyed in Shoven and
Whalley (1983].

Not all analysts use Scarf's algorithm to compute equilibria,

however, a recent advance being .the development of a global version of the
classical Newton-Raphson algorithm.
To limit the scope of this assessment, we shall confine our attention
to only some of the topics that have been the subject of formal modelling.
Our interest here lies mainly in the flex-price descendants of the
disaggregated, fixed-coefficient models traditionally used in drawing up
consistent plans and examining related issues of resource allocation.

These

flex-price models, the so-called CGEs, have been used to tackle a wider range
of problems than their forebearers were.

Thus, while we are not concerned

with the whole class of economy-wide models or flex-price models for a
specific sector, some of what we have to say does apply to "stylized" macromodels featuring nominal magnitudes and considerable aggregation, with or
without flexible prices.

In particular, we explore the insights CGEs afford

into the principal questions that were addressed and whether they can be
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fruitfully employed in tackling other questions.

We shall argue that while

the CGEs are particularly strong in modelling input substitution in
production, commodity substitution in consumption, and the optimizing
decisions of individual agents in response to changes in prices, they are
rather weak in modelling long run processes of development and change.

The

relevant question; then, is whether their strength in the former is sufficient
to make them superior overall to other models which provide a more convincing
treatment of processes.
Another important practical policy issue in mixed economies in which
there are widespread market distortions and the private sector's investment
decisions often are subject to governmental approval or rejection is how to
appraise the social profitability of projects.

This requires the derivation

of a set of shadow prices for goods and factors, taking full account of income
distributional objectives as well as market distortions.

In proposing simple

and work.able rules for such derivation, the celebrated manuals on project
evaluation [Little and Mirrlees, 1974; UNIDO, 1972] _attempt to approximate the
much more complex procedure of obtaining them from an explicit economy-wide,
inter-temporal general equilibrium model with distortions.

It is useful to

examine whether CGEs could be used to derive better approximations than those
resulting from applying the rules of these manuals.
To complete this preamble, it should be mentioned that the relation
between development policy and model building was very much on the minds of
all when this departure into the realm of flex-price models took place.
Ir.deed, a concern with income distribution and alternative patterns of
development provided an important impulse for this departure.
were pursued at length in Chenery

~~•

These themes

[1974], who emphasized the need to

- 7 -
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analyse the distributional aspects of develop~ent.

They concluded that even

though "there are no established models which have been constructed directly
for [this] purpose ••• useful results are obtainable by the imaginative
l ,~

adaptation and extension of existing models." (p. 246).
~

2.

CGEs AS STATIC MODELS
To assess the strengths and weakness of CGEs as analytical tools, it

is necessary to be clear about the problems to be tackled.

There are two

reasons for examining their salient features as static models before
proceeding to establish why they are ill-suited to analyse development
processes, which, by definition, involve movements through time.

First, CGEs

can be used to examine the effects of policy reforms

for example, trade

liberalisation and changes in the structure of taxes

by means of

straightforward comparative statics.

Second, time appears in so-called

dynamic formulations of CGEs in the guise of a string of static equilibria,
each member of which inherits the factor endowments passed on by its
predecessor.
Ii

The salient features of interest may be classified under two
principal headings.

First, there is the structure of markets, including those

for traded goods and foreign capital.

Second, and especially relevant to the

case in which a sequence of static equilibria is strung together to yield a
story of the economy's movement through time, there is the manner in which
investment and savings are brought into equality, which is commonly referred
to as the 'closing rule' for the economy.
It will be helpful to begin with a brief description of the mechanics
of these models.

Each agent (or group of identical agents) chooses his set of
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demands (supplies) given the prices of goods and factors applicable to him,
subject to the relevant budget (technological) constraints.

The condition

that the markets for goods and factors clear then determines the set of
relative prices ruling in equilibrium.

In a 'mixed' model, some prices are

fixed exogenously, so that corresponding to them there will be a set of
'slacks'.

For instance, if the wage rate (in terms of some numeraire good or
!\.

bundle of goods) for some category of labor is fixed exogenously, then the
level of unemplQyment among this group of workers will be endogenous.
Similarly, if the support price of an agricultural commodity is fixed
exogenously, there will be corresponding endogenous variations in stocks
and/or net exports.
less detail.

,The supply and demand functions may be derived in more or

For instance, final demands are represented either as a single

demand function relating disposable income and prices in terms of a numeraire,
or as an aggregate of the demands of several categories of institutions, the
weight of each category in the aggregate being endogenous.

Supply functions

may be specified in varying degrees of detail regarding technology and
industrial organization.
It is fair to assert that most extant multisectoral CGEs are
Walrasian, in the sense that they describe the equilibria of barter economies
in which only relative prices matter.

In certain cases, however, it is

claimed that 'absolute' prices do indeed matter, so it is important to
establish the possible basis for this claim.

Suppose that the values of

certain variables are fixed not in terms of some numeraire good or bundle of
goods, but in 'money' units, which may be thought of as either rupees or
cowrie shells, depending on how one views the parable.

The choice of such

variables must obey certain requirements if the consistency of the system is
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to be maintained, but this need not detain us here.

For the purposes of

I

illustration, let the wage rate be fixed in rupees, so that there is just one
nominal exogenous variable.

If, now, there is a change in some other

t •
I

exogenous condition which leads to a rise in the price of goods denominated in
rupees, then the real wage will fall.

In general, therefore, some or all of

output, employment, consumption and savings will be affected.

This, then, is

the sense in which 'absolute' prices matter.
We shall have more to say about the introduction of money and the
role played by the monetary authority in ratifying the decision to fix certain
so-called nominal variables at particular values in Section 3.

Suffice it to

say for the present that the discussion in the remainder of this section will
not deal at all with nominal magnitudes.

Not only are they best avoided, but

the ma in points can be made in settings in which only relative prices
matter.

It must be emphasised also that the choice of a numeraire good or

bundle of goods is an entirely separate matter from the determination of an
'absolute ' price level, and can proceed quite independently of the latter.
2.1

Market Structure

.
Our use of the term 'Walrasian' to characterise CGEs may have left
the impression· that price-taking behaviour by agents and the determination of
prices through· the clearing of markets are intrinsic parts of their
specification.

In fact, no such restriction is necessary, or even desirable,

although the theoretical and practical difficulties confronting attempts to
incorporate other types of behaviour may be formidable.
Quite frequently, it will happen that the price of a good or factor
is fixed exogenously, whether by government fiat, or a parametrically given
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world price and tariff, or just convention.

In the case of a fully traded

good, net exports can adjust endogenously, while both suppliers and purchasers
are able to transact as much as they please at that price.

In the case of a

non-traded good or factor, however, someone is going to be disappointed.
Either suppliers are on their supply schedules, while purchasers are off their
demand schedules, and there will be excess demand; or purchasers will be on
their demand schedules, while suppliers are off their supply schedules, and
there will be excess supply.

The next step is to specify how the quantity

transacted is going to be rationed, and with what effect on suppliers' and
purchasers' decisions.

To clarify what is involved, consider the case when

labour is in excess supply.

Current practice in CGE modelling is to derive

the level of employment and the wage bill for each type of labour on the
assumption that each class of household will receive a share of such jobs and
wage income equal to its share of the total endowment of that sort of
labour.

In general, there is no compelling analytical justification for the

assumption that each agent will be given a ration in proportion to his or her
notional demand at the going prices.
implicitly rests on.

Yet this is what the above procedure

Moreover, no account is taken of the fact that

households' demands for commodities will be affected by their failure to sell
as much labour as they would like at the going wage rate, except insofar as
their disposable incomes reflect , such rationing.
Turning to imperfect competition among producers, the simplest case
to deal with probably is pure monopoly or monopsony.

To exploit his strategic

opportunities to the full, a profit-seeking monopolist needs to know the
entire demand schedule facing him.

Oligopoly is still more intractable, for

in this case, the aggregate supply of a commodity will be the outcome of a
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non-cooperative game among producers.

When CGE modellers do not assume

perfect competition, their usual practice, which is supported by rather simple
empirical analysis, is to appeal to mark-up theories of pricing, but with the
mark-up exogenously given.

Nevertheless, market structure is likely to exert

an important influence on the strength and direction of resource pulls in the
economy, and further work on incorporating various forms of imperfect
competition is warranted.
Concerning foreign trade, as is well known, if (i) world prices are
parametrically given, (ii) there are constant returns to scale with no sectorspecific factors and (iii) the number of traded goods far exceeds the number
of primary factors, then there will be a tendency towards specialization in
equilibrium.

This tendency has been curbed in CGEs by the introduction of

both imperfect mobility of productive factors and the so-called 'Armington
assumption ' , which postulates a less-than-perfect substitutability of
nominally identical -domestic and foreign goods.

While the former may be

defended in specific instances, the latter practice is a less blatant way of
avoiding excessive specialisation than imposing bounds on export and import
activities, as was done in LP models of yore to get them to behave 'sensibly',
but it is not much less arbitrary for that.

If the country does have some

market power in international trade, then there is certainly a case for
treating this as an opportunity to impose an optimal tariff if domestic firms
behave as atomistic price takers and foreigners are too poorly organised to
retaliate.
models.

Implicitly, this is what was done in some of the LP planning

In CGEs, of course, such market power needs to be treated

appropriately, depending on whether or not it is perceived by firms.
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Closing Rules
As much has been written on closing rules in recent years

be fairly brief.

l/,

we can

Consider, to start with, an economy closed to international

capital flows, so that, in equilibrium, domestic investment must be equal to
domestic savings.

Since no institution -- government, firm or household -- is

constrained to invest what it saves, how are savings and investment decisions
coordinated?
The Arrow-Debreu version of the Walrasian model brings abQut this
coordination by assuming the existence, at the beginning of time, of a
ccmplete set of active markets for ~11 commodities, where each commodity
(good, factor, or service) is distinguished by its physical characteristics,
the date of the transaction and the description of the uncertain state of
nature in which it is exchanged.

At the prices ruling in such markets, each

agent (whether a producer or a consumer, currently alive as well a s ~
unborn) determines his demand or supply subject to a life-time budget or
"technological constraint".

The simultaneous clearance of all of these so-

called contingent commodity markets automatically coordinates savings and
investment decisions.

To wit, a decision to save part of one's income (i.e.

to choose a consumption bundle whose value is less than the value of current
claims) in any period implies a simultaneous decision to consume more than
one's income (to dissave) in some other periods in amounts adding up to the
present value of what is saved.

A decision to invest in the current period

(i.e., to purchase commodities now to augment the flow of production in the
future) is simultaneous with a decision to sell in this period the resulting
future output in the relevant contingent commodity market.

In equilibrium,
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the excess of savers' endowments over their consumption of each contingent
commodity is equal in the aggregate to the net purchases of investors.
Although one could define a set of interest rates applicable to intertemporal
transactions in such an equilibrium, it is not necessary to do so.
In the stock market version of the Walrasian model, instead of a full
set of contingent markets, there exist a set of spot markets and a set of
stock or securities markets in which claims to streams of future outputs are
traded.

Under a set of standard assumptions, the equivalence of the two

versions can be established.
Walrasian though they are in spirit, extant CGEs cannot claim such a
pure lineage, and in the absence of an apparatus for bringing about equality
between savings and investment such as those described above, there is a
limited menu of options to choose from.

The first may be called neoclassical

inasmuch as all relative prices are assumed to be perfectly flexible, and in
equilibrium, all markets clear with full employment of all fact~rs.

Aggregate

savings depend, in general, on the level and distribution of income and
prices, while aggregate investment is simply taken to be equal to aggregate
savings.

"

function.

That is to say, there is no independent investment demand
Nothing is said about the mechanisms that are at work in bringing

about just this amount of investment.
(

In barter economies, no appeal can be

made to the swift and intelligent intervention· of the monetary authorities to
accomplish it; but the right fiscal policies might just do so.
The second so-called 'closing rule' may be called classical in that
the wage rate is fixed in terms of some good or a bundle of goods and the
assumption of full employment is dropped.

Once again, aggregate savings are

endogenous, and whatever is saved is invested.

This case lends itself to .an
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evaluation of the rewards to 'getting the prices right', in the form of the
movements towards full employment induced by parametric variations in the wage
rate.

In their zeal to assail this doctrine, Taylor and Lysy [1979] call this

specification, misleadingly, neoclassical.
In contrast - to the above cases, there are 'closing rules' which
introduce an independent investment function.

Capitalists' "animal spirits",

which are motivated primarily by expectations of future profits based on
considerations other than current conditions, and the government's plans are
assumed to result in an exogenously fixed demand for a bundle of investment
goods or a total outlay in terms of the numeraire (an outlay which is
sometimes confusingly referred to as a "nominal" demand for investment).
There are two ways of accomodating this fixed demand.

First, the assumption

of full employment may be dropped, so that· saving~ may be brought into
equality with investment through shifts in the level of output, employment and
the distribution of income.

Hence, despite the absence of money, this closure

is invariably referred to as 'Keynesian', albeit a vulgar form of the same.
Secondly, full employment can be reinstated by throwing out the condition that
the marginal product of labour be equal to the wage, in which case, shifts in
the distribution of income will have a pre-eminent role.

This variant, which

Kalda= [1955] formulated in his renowned paper on distribution, is usually
dubbed 'neo-Keynesian'.
Turning to the case of an open economy, each of the above accounts is
unaltered in its essentials if the balance of trade is fixed exogenously -again, in terms of the numeraire -- and there are no unrequitted transfers.
If, however, this balance is endogenous, then an independent investment
f,mction is always admissible; for any excess of domestic investment over
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detnestic savings will be financed by an accommodating inflow of foreign
savings.

1./

It should be noted, however, that if both the volume and the

world price of exports are fixed, then fixing the balance of trade will also
determine output and employment immediately in the case where there is no
substitutability between domestic and imported inputs into production.

In

essense, this is the regime of trade-limited growth in Chenery and Strout's
[1966] model.
To see 'closing rules' at work, consider a two-sector economy in
which one sector produces investment
(C)

(I)

goods and the other consumption

goods, both sectors using capital and labour in their production

activities under constant returns to scale.

With the given aggregate

endowment of capital and labour, the production possibility curve (with full
and efficient utilization of both factors) is shown as
point on
and
from

r

AB

determines the price

Pr

of

I

AB

in Figure 1.

good and the factor prices

(of labour and capital, respectively), all in terms of
A to

B,

(increases) if
production.

pI
I

and

Any

w increase (decrease) and

r

C.

w

In moving

decreases

is labour (capital) intensive relative to

C in

Hence, given the distribution of capital and labour endowments

among agents in the economy, the factor prices will determine the distribution
of income.

Furthermore, given

the demand for

Pr, their savings behaviour will determine

C (and supply of savings).

For instance, if workers neither

own capital nor save while capitalists neither work nor consume, the demand
for

C equals wage income.

the demand for

With full employment of labour, in such a case,

C rises (falls) as one moves from

is labour (capital) intensive.

A to

B as long as

I
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I good

i
r
Ia

A

---+ C good

0

Figure 1
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More generally, one can depict the demand for
by the income distribution associated with the prices
p

point

on

output, say
with
D0

IO

DD

once at

P*

determined.

DD •

as a curve such as
the supply of

'

as its

IO

on

AB

with ·

C

!:J

C good as determined

Pr '

and

w

r

at a

For any level of ·I- good

is determined by the point

PO

on AB

I

coordinate and the demand is indicated by the point

r0

as coordinate.

If

DD

intersects

AB

once and only

as depicted in Figure 1, a unique laissez-fair~ equilibrium is
This, in a nutshell, is the story of the first closing rule.

The second closing rule deals with the case where a minimum wage rate

w (in

terms of

C) higher than that (w*)

obtaining at

Without loss of generality, we assume that
at any point on

AB

from

B up to

good is labour intensive. Then
w,

But as is seen from Figure 1, there is an

C at all such points.

increased beyond its level at

is specified.

P, at which the wage rate equals

the minimum wage constraint is met.
excess demand for

I

P*

Now the output of

C can be

P at the cost of full employment level by

choosing production points along the so-called labour Rybczynski line

PA' • At any point other than P on
remain the same as at

PA' ,

Pr'

w and

r

P ; but because of unemployment and its impact on

agents' incomes, the demand curve for

C shifts to

new unemployment equilibrium established at
( .

the prices

DD' , as depicted, with a

P' •

The third closing rule can be illustrated by viewing the output of
I

at

P

spirits".

as the fiscal investment 'demand' as determined by "animal
With full employment this cannot be met, since the supply of

savings is inadequate (or equivalently, the demand for
can be seen from the corresponding point on
while maintaining the output of

I

as at

DD •

P,

C is too much), as

By creating unemployment

the production point moves
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P •

As

long as the resulting change in the level and

distribution of income shifts the demand curve to, say,

IP

once at

D"D"

to intersect

P", again an unemployment equilibrium is established.

The upshot of all this is that the qualitative behaviour of the
economy (as a statical system) stems not as much from the extent of
disaggregation or the possibilities of substitution, as from the manner in
which investment and savings (more generally, supplies and demands) are
brought into equality.

No doubt the specific magnitudes of the economy's

responses to changes in the exogenous variables - depend on how many goods and
households there are and whether there is easy substitution in production and
consumption.

Yet, while the detail afforded should be valuable in examining

resource pulls, it is the choice of closing rule which seems to matter for
aggregate output and the factoral distribution of income.

2.3

Empirical Underpinnings of CGEs
In any model, one has to make choices about the appropriate

functional forms for the various behavioural and technological relationships
and assign values to the parameters that occur in such relationships.

If the

model is an econometric one, then in principle at least, one can estimate the
parameters from data given the functional forms, or even choose among
alternative forms through some method of model selection.

But in working with

a CGE, one has to choose ftmctional forms that are at once consistent with
theory (for instance, demand functions have to satisfy Walras' law) and
analytically tractable.

Since available econometric estimates are often not

consistent with one or both requirements, they can rarely be used in a CGE.
Further, in some of the CGEs, the Armington assumption is made.

Yet hardly
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any empirical estimate of the relevant elasticity of substitution exists for
any country.

In view of these difficulties, the most commonly used procedure

for parametrizing the CGE is "calibration", a procedure which involves
...

assuming some parameter values rather than estimating them econometrically

1/,

and hence the strong assumption that the initial position of the economy is
one of equilibrium.

Although the latter is hardly a tenable assumption, the

data from which many of the parameters are derived are often assembled to
satisfy the accounting identities of a SAM and can therefore lay some claim to
internal consistency.

Suffice it to say here that given the strong and often
l

untestable assumptions required to set up a CGE model empirically, the
resulting policy simulations it yields must be used with great care.

3.

TIME AND MJNEY

As development is a process, both a clearly defined real time frame
and an account of how the economy shifts forward in time are needed.

In

Section 2, there were no explicit references to the former, and the discussion
of savings and investment was confined to the unit time period without
considering how expectations about the future are formed and how they

~·

influence decisions to accumulate wealth.

Likewise, when examining the claim

that absolute prices matter, nothing was saiq about inflation, which is a
process invoiving time.
In choosing a time frame, it is traditional (and useful) to
distinguish bet"Neen the short, medium and long run.

In the short run, many

variables which are endogenous in the medium and long runs are fixed
exogenously, for example, the capital stock in each sector and, particularly
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in Keynesian formulations, some prices as well.

In the medium run, the

installed capacities to produce many goods can be augmented or reduced by net
investment or disinvestment, the growth of the labour force can be predicted
with fair confidence and there is less rigidity in prices.

Similarly, it is

assumed that the technology is known and that preferences change little, if at
all.

In the long run, almost everything, including technology, can change

significantly and in uncertain ways.

While these distinctions are drawn for

analytical purposes, it is understood that the various changes are taking
place continuously and at different speeds, except that some changes are
ignored to show the effects of others in bolder colours.
As noted above, CGEs are often used to generate a string of results
which purport to show the movement of the economy through time.

This form of

pseudo-dynamic analysis is accomplished by linking the changes in the
exogenous variables over time to the values of the endogenous variables in
equilibrium at a point in time.

Even in those variants in which investment is

endogenously determined within the unit _time period, its level depends only on
current prices and endowments.
like the present.

In effect, agents expect the future to be just

Hence, when model builders label a sequence of results,

"1976, 1977, 1978, 1979, 1980,

...

11

' they are presenting the movement of the

economy through time as a chain of short period equilibria, each of which is
based on myopic expectations.

It is hard to defend the notion that this sort

of comparative statics involves meaningful dynamics.!:../
While this comparative statical approach to the movement of the
economy through time is unsatisfactory, it is not clear that there are more
appealing alternatives.
of Walrasian tatonnement.

The answer cannot be sought in the virtual dynamics
Nor is there much promise that the so-called price
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and stock adjustment models can be employed to give the system credible
r

dynamic behaviour.

For how is one to make sense of the juxtaposition of the

refined optimisations by agents which underlie the static equilibrium at a
point in time and the crude 'adjustments' of the so-called dynamic behaviour
which shifts the system through time?
The central diffkulty in dealing with time is that there is
uncertainty about the future, and hence unavoidable risk in a world that lacks
a complete set of contingent .markets.

If uncertainty is incorporated in a way

that eliminates the possibility of what could be loosely termed as "regret",
or perhaps " time inconsistency", neither of which should be confused with
i rrationality , this will again ~educe a dynamic problem to an essentially
static one.

In any event, the escape from crude adjustment rules which shift

t he system from one period to the next to the refined calculus of
intertemporal optimisation leads either to inconsistencies or to the reduction
of the problem into an expanded static one.

Thus, -while it is both possible

and desirable to introduce other forms of investment behaviour than thos~
considered here, it remains the case that constructing a sequence of
equilibria in the manner described above is unlikely to yield a plausible
account of an economy ' s dynamic behaviour.
Turning to money, economic development is invariably accompanied by
increasing monetization in very poor countries and a progressively more
elaborate system of financial intermediation, markets and institutions in more
affluent ones.

In the short -to medium run, these features of the economy may

be taken as given.

But any account of inflation must include the role of

money and other financial assets, as well as the behaviour of financial
institutions.

Is there a home for these elements in a CGE?

CBD/R-019/7.21.83

- 22 -

Now, to all intents and P.urposes, most of the CGEs under discussion
here are barter economies, in which, in equilibrium, only relative prices are
determined.

Some hold the view that it is impossible to introduce fiat money

into a Walrasian framework in a meaningful way, if only because exchange
involving money is a process, and hence cannot be described by a system in
which there is no real time.

One attempt to do so postulates that real cash

balances enter utility or production functions as arguments on the grounds
that there are costs of transacting without the use of money.

Alternatively,

there are dynamic models, such as the overlapping generations variety, in
which fiat money makes possible some trades across generations that otherwise
would be infeasible, thereby moving the economy to an intertemporally
efficient path.

But neither of _these attempts is very satisfactory, and both

are essentially ad hoc.

Some theorists -- for instance, Wallace [1983] --

appeal to legal restrictions on private intermediation to explain why money is
held in a world where other equally safe, interest-bearing placements for
wealth are available.
What . of those CGEs for which changes in absolute prices can have real
effects?

One approach is to assume that a certain set of variables -- wage

rates, investnent and transfer payments -- can be maintained at exogenously
given nominal values.

Indeed, it is sometimes argued that this is a

realistic, rather than merely simplifying, assumption.

Although the role

played by the monetary authority is left implicit in this story, it seems that
the authority must accomodate all wage contracts struck in rupees, as well as
any exogenous nominal flows.

For its part, the public must make all current

decisions without reference to what the authority has done in the past, or
what it is up to now.

A second approach involves making a polar opposite
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assumption about the monetary authority's behaviour, namely, that it fixes the
stock of money without any reference to what is happening in the economy.

All

institutions are given a demand function for money (the basis for which i s not
quiteconsistent with utility or profit maximisation), so that when the money
supply is fixed by the authority, a · set of prices denominated in rupees wil l
result.

Once again, however, the authority's past behaviour does not enter

into the public's current decisions.

Whatever else may be said about it, this

second approach does have the merit of specifying explicitly the mechanism at
work.
These two approaches to the determination of absolute prices employ,
in effect, very simple versions of the quantity theory of money, and neither,
as currently formulated, can deal satisfactorily with inflation, which is a
process in real time.

The criticisms we have levelled at the practice of

stringing together a set of static equilibria will apply even more forcefully
here.

For example, if the monetary authority strives to validate any nominal

wage contract, then private agents are going to discover as much at some point
along the way.

One need not adopt an extreme 'rational expectations' position

to see that only a very gullible public would fail to adjust their behaviour

accordingly once they found out.

The other version, in which the authority

fixes the initial supply of money and its subsequent course at the beginning
of time and does not intervene subsequently, whatever may happen afterwards,
also strains credulity.

What can be said is that if agents are unable to

distinguish between real and monetary shocks, then changes in absolute prices
may have real effects .
All in all, it appears that the chances of introducing inflationary
processes into these models in a credible way are problematical at best.
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INCOME DISTRIBUTION
As indicated in the Introduction, it was hoped that CGEs would yield

useful insights into the evolution of the distribution of income.

With the
;:

advantage of hindsight this now seems unduly optimistic, expecially in view of
the di~ficulties of dealing with processes.

Nevertheless, it is instructive

to look at the influences on the distribution of income in a static setting,
before turning to the processes at work over the long run.
In CGEs, the central dimension of the distribution of income is that
among factors.

This is not to say that a distribution of incomes by size

cannot be generated endogenously.

For if the distribution of factors among

institutions and/or the parameters of the distributions for the various
household categories are known and assumed stable, then it is possible to
construct a mapping from factor to household incomes.

These mappings are

rather ad hoc, however, and serve mainly to complete the circular flow of
production, incomes and demand, although it should be noted that they do
permit the introduction of variations in tastes across households, which may
matter under certain circumstances.
The substance of the main results has already been set out in the
section on 'closing rules', which is itself a summary of work that attempted
to understand why the large numerical systems behave as they do.

Indeed, one

of the principal findings f=om such CGEs is that the distribution of income is
not very responsive to incremental changes in policy.

"Only when a sufficient

number of different interventions are applied simultaneously, so that there
is, in effect, a change in development strategy, are more sizable or lasting
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effects possible" [Adelman and Robinson, 1978, p. 17].

As

Taylor and Lysy

(1979] have demonstrated, this behaviour can be explained quite adequately by
s _imple one or two-sector macro models.

If the choice of closing rule is

changed, the system dances to a different (and predictable) tune, however
intricate and impenetrable the background music of its structure may appear at
first glance!
In our view, none of these variations will give a convincing account
of how the size distribution of income is determined over the long run.
Bruno (1977] put it:

As

"There are some basic forces operating in the

development process which affect functional and sectoral shares for which
manageable models should continue to be developed

[Multi-sectoral CGEs]

remain background production and allocation models and are quite removed from
being able to explain wealth transition matrices for families of different
sizes and social background". (p. 8).

Thus, if one accepts that the size

distribution of income is generated by such cumulative processes, one is led
to look for approaches which emphasize economic forces other than the
determination of relative prices in a static setting.
5.

SOME POSSIBLE USES OF CGEs
In concentrating thus far on the weaknesses of CGEs, we have

attempted to show that, as currently formulated at least, they have limited
usefulness in addressing many topics.

What, when, are they good for?

Among

the potentially valuable uses already mentioned are the analysis of the
effects of measures to liberalise trade and reform taxes, and other examples
of changes in policy or the exogenous variables characterizing the economy's
environment come readily to mind.

As

this literature has been extensively
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reviewed elsewhere (Shaven and Whalley, 1983], however, we will discuss two
other uses in some detail:

drawing up a consistent plan; and deriving shadow

prices for project evaluation, a subject which is obviously closely related to
that of policy reforms.
5.1

Consistent Plans
In the past, the formulation of a consistent, medium-term development

plan was often accomplished with the help of some variant of fixed-price,
input-output analysis.

Although we have expressed strong reservations about

the usefulness of generating a sequence of short period equilibria as an
account of how the economy grows and changes, the formulation of such plans
might be improved with the aid of a CGE.

In this time frame, the appropriate

prices are Marshallian normal prices, whether endogenous or other.rlse.
One way of proceeding is as follows:
described in Blitzer
for 5, 7 or 10 years.

~

Using the standard methods

al [1975], or otherwise, a consistent plan is drawn up

The associated path of investments will yield a set of

capital stocks, sector-by-sector, for the terminal year.

Similarly, available

labour supplies will be known from independent projections of the labour
force, which the consistent plan has been derived to respect.

With factor

endowments thus given in the terminal year, the set of prices consistent with
them can be computed from the static CGE of the planner's choice.

Concerning

the closing rule, if investment is determined endogenously, the only
requirement is that its level and composition be compatible with that in the
plan, which is implied by the post-terminal conditions specified in drawing up
the plan.

If, on the other hand, total investment is set exogenously in the

CGE, its level is simply taken from that in the plan.
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Now, if the rate of profit (or equivalently the rate of quasi-rent on
the same sort of capital good) differs greatly across sectors or from the
pattern of rates of profit that the planner believes to be 'normal', then the
consistent plan will need some revision.

In making these revisions, the

departures of the rates of profit from their normal pattern (or straight
uniformity) will be useful guides, and after a few iterations, it should be
possible to contrive the requisite result. The consistent plan that results
may be regarded as good.

Moreover, in this setting, it is appropriate to call

the associated set of prices 'normal' prices, that is, prices which reflect
the set of _long run profit rates appropriate to the rate and composition of
the growth of output.

In effect, this procedure envisages a very powerful

planning authority, which creates supplies of factors in the terminal year of
a plan, whereupon prices get determined in what amounts to a pure exchange
economy, in high Walrasian tradition.
In the approach sketched above, arriving at a consistent set of
outputs, incomes and other activities, together with the associated set of
market prices, is not simply a matter of mechanical computation.

Rather, the

analyst draws a picture of the economy at a moment in time when it has
attained (approximate) steady state growth by making informal reconcilations
between the projections from a consistency framework and the results from the

'.

static CGE.

Whether the story is credible will depend as much on the quality

of the analyst 's judgment and insight as on the finer details of either
model.

Nevertheless, used in this way, a CGE may permit a significant

improvement over what would be derived from a traditional ~onsistency
framework by itself, principally by making possible a more efficient pattern
of investment.

Whether the additional time and resources which went into the
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building of the CGE would be warranted by such putative improvements is, of
course, open to question.

As yet, there is insufficient evidence to arrive at

a definite judgement.
5.2

Shadow Prices
The derivation and use of shadow prices based on the principles in

Little and Mirrlees [1974] and UNIDO [1972] have flourished in the past
decade.

The most illuminating way of understanding these principles is to

view them as simple rules that yield estimates of the shadow prices derived
from a more complicated model of the relevant economy.
Suppose, to begin with, that there are no distortions in the economy
and the government's only objective is an "appropriate" income distribution.
Then the second welfare theorem of neo-classical welfare economics assures us
that under specified assumptions about technology and tastes; any desired
income distribution (within the feasible set) can be achieved through lump sum
transfers of income (or equivalently, redistribution of initial endowments)
among agents.

No other intervention in the economy is needed.

Clearly, in

such a world the equilibrium market-clearing prices are also the shadow prices
for goods and factors.

In particular, if the economy is a price-taker in

world markets, the shadow prices for traded goods will be their border or
world prices.
The resulting shadow prices could be used for project evaluation, ·but
there is no need to use the acceptance (or rejection) of projects to influence
allocation and distribution!

For the government has unrestricted scope to

achieve any desired and feasible distribution of income (and welfare) both at
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a point in time and intertemporally through lump sum taxes and transfers, and
there are no discrepancies between shadow and market prices.
Even if optimal lump sum taxes cannot be levied, there are other
circumstances in which a full social optimum can be attained.

In a Diamond-

Mirrlees economy [1971], for example, optimal commodity taxation ensures that
public and private sector .E_roduction decisions will be based on the same set
of producer prices.

That is to say, shadow prices at the optimum are also

decentralizing prices, and once again all decisions concerning the acceptance
of projects can be left to the managers of firms, whether public or
private.

2../

Thus, the computation of shadow prices for the use of government

agencies in evaluating projects is only interesting and relevant when the
government does not have the power to impose optimal taxes.

However, the

computation of the optimal set of taxes may, in effec.t, involve the solution
of a CGE.
In practice, it i~ fair to say that most governments in LDCs have
virtually no power to effect lump sum transfers and scarcely more to
redistribute ownership of factor endowments.

Their ability to impose

distortionary commodity taxes in an optimal way is also limited.

Moreover, in

any initial equilibrium associated with such restrictions on the power to tax,
savings are likely to be lower than the socially optimal level, so that there
will be a premium on both (uncommitted) revenue and private savings relativ~
to private consumption.

In such a world, undertaking a project -- or

prohibiting the private sector from doing so -- provides an instrument to
influence production and the distribution of income in a socially desirable
direction.
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The point of departure, therefore, is some equilibrium in which the
whole panopoly of taxes and quotas is not only non-optimal, but also cannot be
changed, and various prices are sticky, so that there will be rationing in
some markets.

Defining a project as an activity which produces a vector of

outputs from a vector of inputs, and viewing any project as a small
disturbance to an arbitrary equilibrium, we are interested in deriving a set
of shadow prices which will reveal whether a project will improve soci~l
welfare starting from that equilibrium.

Such -prices may be called "welfare-

detecting" shadow prices, to distinguish them from the "decentralizing prices"
associated with a social optimum, a distinction that forms the main theme of
Dreze's [1982] insightful paper.

Now, relative to any equilibrium, the

(welfare-detecting) shadow price of a good or factor is simply the change in
the level of social welfare that would result if an extra unit of the same
were produced in the public sector.

These shadow prices will, except under

certain circumstances that need not concern us here, serve as well in
evaluating projects in the private as in the public sector.
A CGE looks like a promising tool with which to calculate welfaredetecting shadow prices.

Appropriately specified, it can encompass all manner

of distortions, including quotas affecting traded goods and other forms of
rationing, and the equilibrium corresponding to them can be computed to yield
the reference point for the derivation of shadow prices.
a good or a factor can be computed in two steps:

The shadow price of

in the first step, the

initial reference equilibrium is perturbed by adding to (or subtracting from)
the availability of that good or factor by a unit, and the new equilibrium is
computed.

At the second step, the change in social welfare relative to the

reference equilibrium is computed, thus yielding the desired shadow price.

....
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For small changes, the change in social welfare will be approximately equal to
a suitably weighted sum of the changes in the utilities of individual agents.

.•

Once the choice of social weights has been settled, therefore, the
calculation of shadow prices is thus routine.

It turns out that under diverse

circumstances, the relative shadow prices of fully traded goods are still
their respective relative border prices, even in a distortion-ridden world of
the sort considered here.

This is indeed the theoretical basis for the

principles laid down in Little and Mirrlees (1974], and it ~bviates the need
for to use CGEs · to compute the shadow prices of fully traded goods.

Moreover,

the shadow prices of non-traded goods can be derived from those of traded
goods in certain situations (see Srinivasan [1982] on this matter).

Implicit

in this analysis is the assumption that the economy has access to perfect
international capital markets, in which case th~ foreign trade deficit is
endogenous.

Even in the polar case of an exogenously specified (and binding)

limit on the size of the foreign trade deficit, the shadow prices of fully
traded goods will, in general, be proportional to their respective border
prices [Bell and Devarajan, 1983].
If the simple rules do this well, what can a CGE contribute?

First,

the simple rules for estimating the shadow prices
of traded goods that are
}
.

subject to quantitative restrictions and non-traded goods subject to various
forms of rationing are approximate ones, and may yield substantial errors.
Moreover, the shadow prices of non-traded goods for which markets clear will
depend, in general, on those for all other goods anf factors, so any errors in
the latter will be propagated in the former.

Such errors are avoided when

shadow prices are derived from a CGE formulated so as to capture all the
relevant distortions; for such shadow prices reflect all the effects of the
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distortions and are mutually and. simultaneously determined.

Second, when the

shadow prices of fully traded goods are proportional to their respective
border prices, the (common) factor of proportionality will, in general, depend
on production and consumption decisions everywhere in the economy.
Furthermore, this factor of proportionality affects the shadow prices of all
non-traded goods and factors.

Once again, shadow prices derived from a CGE

will reflect this interdependence in full, which is a notableadvantage when
there is more than one non-traded good.

Hence, we conclude that CGEs will be

valuable in deriving shadow prices when quantitative restrictions appear to
affect domestic and foreign markets in an important way.
This is a natural point to introduce the use of LP models into the
discussion.

w~en LP models were first introduced into the tool kit of

development economics, it was primarily in the ,context of development planning
with the implicit assumption that the planner has enough policy instruments at
his .disposal to implement the optimal solution churned out by the model, be it
in respect of private and public consumption, private and public investment,
or exports and imports.

That the shadow prices associated with the

constraints of the LP model reflected resource scarcities was well understood;
but apart from any implications they may have for the set of optimal taxes or
subsidies needed to make market prices mirror resource scarcities, there was
little room for them to play much of a role, given the considerable scope of
the government's policy instruments.
Moreover, the informational economies arising out of solving several
smaller LP models iteratively rather than one giant LP model were also
appreciated.

Indeed, two-level and multi-level planning procedures and

decomposition algorithms were designed precisely to exploit such economies.
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In some versions, an aggregated LP model of low dimensionality was used to
generate key shadow prices (e.g., for capital, forcing trade balance, etc.)
which were then used in more detailed sectoral models.

It is fair to say,

however, that the fact that different agents may have different objectives and
may not reveal their true preferences and constraints in this iterative

.

dialogue did not play any role in the early literature, at least in a
d·e velopment planning context.

In this respect, they were not too different

from extant CGEs, in that the latter incorporate neither strategic behaviour
by agents nor asymmetric as well as incomplete inforlli.ation among them.
The LP models do, however, have some advantages over CGEs.

By

keeping the number of goods sufficiently small, it is possible to solve LP
models which are specified so as to span many years.

This has the great

advantage of permitting the introduction of foreign borrowing (under the
control of the government) in such a way as to yield a simultaneous
determination of optimal production, investment and foreign indebtedness, a
simultaneity which lies beyond the foreseeable reach of non-linear CGEs
f eaturint comparable degrees of disaggregation.

The objective function for

t his purpose is the discounted present value of the stream of consumption over
the planning horizon, plus the discounted value of the capital stock net of
foreign indebtedness in the terminal year.

For a sufficiently distant

horizon, it is reasonable to expect a longish stretch of steady state growth
free of the adjustments attending the initial and terminal conditions.

The

shadow prices ruling in this stretch of time are perhaps more appropriate for
use in project evaluation.

To the extent that the activities of the LP model

(i.e. the columns of the LP tableau) reflect the choices made by agents in
response to fixed, but possibly non-optimal, tax and other interventions, and
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the objective function is social welfare, these shadow prices will be the true
welfare-detecting, second best shadow prices.
The practical question in all this, then, is whether the comparative
simplicity and cheapness of solving LP models and the simultaneous derivation
of an optimal foreign borrowing path outweigh the somewhat unsatisfactory
assumptions of fixed coefficients in production, consumption and investment,
_which, in effect, reflect a fixed and unchanging set of taxes and subsidies.

As is so often the case, the answer does not lie so much in theory as in
empirical analysis, and may vary with the circumstances of each case.

One

possibility that is worth exploring is to start by deriving the key
irttertemporal parameters, such as the accounting rate of interest and the
premia on private savings and public income, from an LP model of the sort
sketched above.

As a second step, these parameters can be incorporated into

the specification of a static CGE from which welfare-deteting shadow prices
can be obtained in the manner we have described.
6.

CONCLUDING DISCUSSION
In the light of the above assessment of extant CGEs, which owes much

to the extensive work on such models over the past decade, we conclude by
taking up the question of what problems now seem most worth tackling and what
improvements in such models are most pressingly needed.

We content ourselves

with sketching out a few ideas, organising our discussion around two groups of
topics:

consistency planning and policy refora; and income distribution and

the long run.

.::
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Consistency Planning and Policy Reform
We have already discussed, in Section S, how traditional consistency

models and CGEs can be teamed to formulate a consistent development plan and
how welfare-detecting shadow prices appropriate to that setting may be derived
from the same economy-wide models.

Similarly, CGEs may be used to examine the

resource pulls exerted by changes in taxes and other public policies.

As

currently specified, however, CGEs are not particularly satisfactory for these
purposes.
First, while agriculture and certain service sectors are competitive,
other sectors of the economy are manifestly not so.

How, and in what form,

imperfect competition is to be introduced will depend not only on the actual
market structures in question, but also on "the computational difficulties they
pose.

In economies with very extensive public ownership of industry and

utilities, it will also be necessary to specify the behaviour of public
enterprises, in the likely event that their managers have considerable de
facto autonomy.

Secondly -- and this is an old refrain -- more attention must

be paid to how the labour market works, especially in the organised sectors of
the economy, where clearing of the labour market through flexible wages seems
to be a poor description of what actually happens.
Thirdly, there is the pervasiveness of rationing, which affects both
firms and households.

While quotas, licenses and other bureaucratic

allocations may be undesirable forms of intervention, their presence must be
recognised and dealt with, even if the experiment in question is their
abolition (in part or in whole).

In some cases, of course, such allocations

may result in little more than lump sum transfers, as when, for example, the
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beneficiaries can resell the allocations they purchased at the regulated price
in a thriving black market.

In others, resales may not be possible --

electric power supplies are an obvious example

or transactions costs may be

so large, perhaps because of moral scruple, as to make them unprofitable.

In

yet another case, real resources may be wasted on lobbying for, or seeking,
quota rents or tariff revenues (Krueger [1974]; Bhagwati and Srinivasan
[1980]).

Whenever quantity rationing does intrude, it becomes necessary to

specify what firms and households will do when they are so constrained.

It

should be added, however, that while, in principle, the derivation of all
demands and supplies . under quantity rationing is well understood, it may prove
to be a formidably difficult task in practice unless the number of goods
rationed is very small.

To sum up, here is a rich agenda of issues to tax

economy-wide model . builders with a taste for applying relevant theory.
6.2

Toe Lon~ Run and Income Distribution
In approaching the long run, it may be necessary to deal with just a

few issues at a time.

For example, the optimal paths of accumulation, foreign

borrowing and the depletion of exhaustible resources (if any) are naturally
linked, and associated with them will be some key 'national parameters' for
project evaluation, such as the accounting rate of interest and the premium on
saving.

Then again, it is plausible that the distribution of income, the

structure of the economy and the working of markets are closely related, which
suggests another nexus to be studied.
To examine the basic forces at work in development viewed as a long
run process,

a

fairly aggregated framework is virtually inescapable.

Perhaps

the best way of starting the analysis is to distil a fairly descriptive

.:i
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account from the historical experience of a particular country of interest,
paying attention to the effects of changing institutions and gradual but vital
processes, such as demographic changes, resource exhaustion, innovations,
urbanization and so on.

A 'model' which is at once simple, elegant and broad

in sweep, even if it does not encompass all of the above, is Lewis' [1954]
celebrated model of development with unlimited supplies of labour.

Unfor-

tunately, the wooden formalism that the subsequent work of others brought to
this model has added little to our understanding of development beyond what
was learned from Lewis' original contribution.

Be that as it may, a study of

a country's economic history which concen~rates on structural changes may
suggest one or two key issues or phenomena which will provide the focus for a
formal model.

It may also provide some clues as to what 'closing rule' best

characterises the working of the economy, which would be a key element in any
such model.
Another good reason for approaching these issues through case studies
of particular countries is that it forces the analyst to concentrate on how
each economy in question is actually organised and how its people behave, both
as individuals and as social groups.

To quote Joan Robinson [1977]:

"Micro questions--concerning the relative prices of commodities and
the behavior of individuals, firms, and households--cannot be
discussed in the air without any reference to the structure of the
economy in which they exist, and to the processes of cyclical and
secular change. Equally, macro theories of accumulation and
effective demand are generalizations about micro behavior. [ ••• ] If
there is no micro theory, there cannot be any macro theory either.
[
]
-

...

The macro setting of the analysis of •iscarce means with
alternative uses" is very vaguely sketched. [ ••• ] Nothing much is
usually said about the inhabitants of the model. The ancestry of
Adam Smith is often claimed for it, but his world was inhabited by
workers, employers, and gentlemen. Here there are only
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"transactors" or "economic subjects." To borrow Michio Morishima's
trope, the people in this model are like the conventionally
invisible property men of the Kabuki theatre, and only the
commodities have speaking parts."
As for the distribution of productive assets over the long run, we
need answers to the questions:

who saves, where do the savings go, what forms

of investment do they finance and what rates of return do they earn?

Once

again, it is no solution to engage in the mechanical manipulation of
parameters.

What is needed is the development of some relevant theory,

drawing inductively upon empirical investigations of what has happened in a
particular country or countries.
Moreover, there are two distinct dimensions of income distribution
over the long run that ought to concern us.

The first is a straightforward

comparison of the present and future patterns ?f income distribution in terms
that reflect economic and social organisation:
move over the next 20 years?

How will the share of profits

Will the gap between a landlord's and a

peasant's income be wider a g~neration hence than it is now?

The second, as

Bruno emphasises, is more subtle and difficult, involving as it does the life
cycle of a cohort of indivduals drawn from particular social groups.

For

example, of every 100 peasants in their twenties today, how many will be
peasants, proletarians, artisans, or even businessmen and landlords, 20 years
on?
As

And what will be the occupations taken up by their respective children?
for the resulting changes iri individual welfare, even if the "average

peasant" is destined to become an urban proletarian, he may be better off as a
result.

More importantly, his metamorphosis entails a shift in the balance of

social forces and perhaps a change in the way in which the economy functions.
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Finally, although we have argued trenchantly against the use of a
sequence of short_ period equilibria to tell a story about the movement of the
ecopomy over time, the relation between the short run and the long run is an
important one and will not simply go away.

Of especial interest is how the

process of output and income determination in the short run is reflected in
the evolution of the economy in the long run.
To sum up, in our view the questions which can be profitably
addressed by extant CGEs are restricted in important ways by the nature of
their theoretical foundations, though there are prospective improvements
through the introduction of non-competitive behaviour and various forms of
rationing.

What they can say about income distribution is limited, and their

treatment of factor employment is not wholly convincing, resting as it does on
crude specifications of how the labour market works.

More importantly, they

are particularly ill-suited to analyse processes involving real time, such as
accumulation and inflation.

Skillfully used, they may improve resource

allocation in the context of the formulation of a medium term development
plan, they can assess the resource pulls exerted by policy reforms, and they
will yield shadow prices appropriate to distortion-ridden economies.

Their

fruitful application to the analysis o.f processes may, however, have to await
the arrival of more satisfactory theoretical foundations than those available
to applied model builders in the past.
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Footnotes

1/
-

See, for example, Adelman and Robinson [1978]; Dervis and Robinson [1982];
Dervis, de Melo and Robinson [1982]; J. de Melo [1980]; Robinson and Tyson
[1983]; Taylor~ al [1980].

Y

See, for example, the symposium in the Journal of Development Econo~i~s,
March, 1979, and Lysy [1982].

3/

This is the closing rule adopted by Ahluwalia and · Lysy in their work on
Malaysia [Lysy, 1982].

!:.I

We have not established that DD has the particular shape depicted in
Figure 1, but the following argument is unaffected provided DD, whatever
its shape, intersects the frontier AB just once.

2./

Shaven and Whalley [1983] describe "calibration" in some detail.

2./

There is some evidence from the CGEs used to analyze tax policy, such as
those of Fullerton et al (1983], that replacing myopic expectations with
perfect foresight doesnot greatly change the welfare effects of replacing
income taxes with a progressive consumption tax~ In any event, perfect
foresight is not evidently a more attractive assumption than myopia.

21

For extensive discussions of this point, see Dreze (1982] and Srinivasan
(1982].

' \?
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